

# **EXPLORING THE SOURCES OF RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT RADICALIZATION: Some Transatlantic Perspectives**

**D. Elaine Pressman\***

**Abstract:** This paper explores the sources of radicalization from a three tier model. The model includes macro-level sources, micro level sources and incipient sources of radicalization. The concept of “incipient radicalization’ is introduced in the paper. Four stages of incipient radicalization are defined. These stages are related to four developmental periods including early childhood, early school age, later school-age, and adolescence. Examples are provided for each stage of incipient radicalization. The paper also explores transatlantic similarities and differences in the definition of radicalization, and suggests subtle differences in interpretation. The importance of radicalization and its relationship to violence on both sides of the Atlantic is considered. It is suggested that incipient radicalization be explored in the future in terms of strategies designed to counter-radicalization. Incipient radicalization, in its four stages, is identified as the predisposing role for what later becomes established radicalization behavior.

**Keywords:** radicalization, violent extremism, counter-radicalization, models of radicalization, sources of radicalization, developmental radicalization.

---

\* Senior Research Fellow, Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Paterson School of International Relations, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, and Adjunct Professor (Research), Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada Kingston.

## **1. Introduction**

There are more questions about radicalization than answers. Three central questions need to be answered. What is radicalization? What are the causes or sources of radicalization? What is the relationship of radicalization to violent extremism and homegrown terrorism?

There is a growing consensus concerning the nature and definition of “radicalization” although what is agreed upon by security services is not necessarily understood by the general public. There are many models and ideas concerning the origins of radicalization. There are questions as to how dangerous radicalization is and its relationship to violent extremism. The sources of radicalization have not been fully identified. In this document, developmental sources of radicalization will be identified and analyzed within a three tier framework. The new model is intended to contribute to a fuller understanding of the processes of radicalization, the sources and assist in the development of counter-radicalization strategies.

Three source based categories of radicalization are defined and examined in this paper. The first source category of radicalization exists at the macro-level. This source category functions at the conceptual level and provides the ideological basis. It constitutes the *motivational source* of radicalization. The second source category of radicalization functions at the micro level. This source exists at the level of the individual and functions as the individualized driver of radicalization. This category encompasses the forces which act upon the individual to drive the radicalization process and are the *force sources* of radicalization. The third source category is a developmental source. This source occurs prior to the macro and micro sources. It is an antecedent source. This source category is incipient and can be latent for years. Four stages of incipient latent radicalization are identified and described. These sources relate to the established knowledge base of radicalization.

## **2. Transatlantic Definitions of Radicalization**

There are many definitions of radicalization in use today. There are significant differences in these definitions. The same semantic label, “radicalization” is used on both sides of the Atlantic. This term, however, denotes slight process differences on the two continents.

The term “radicalization” in Europe generally refers to “the process of adopting an extremist belief system and the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear as a method of effecting changes in society” (Precht, 2007). The Canadian definition penned by The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Alternative Analysis Unit does not assume the adoption of violence. The term “radicalization” is defined by the RCMP as “the process by which individuals are introduced to an overly ideological message and belief system and taught or encouraged to follow thought and behavior patterns that could eventually (but not always) lead to extremist activity or direct action (RCMP, 2007).

The distinction between the two definitions is subtle but noteworthy. One definition stipulates the willingness to use violence. The second definition is focused more on exposure to a belief system with violence more optional in the second definition.

The AIVD, the Dutch Intelligence Service defines “radicalization” as a “serious unabated threat”. “Radicalization” is considered “a danger to the democratic legal order” and includes the “use of undemocratic methods including violence” (AIVD, 2005, 2007). The perceived threat is minimized if violence and undemocratic methods are not assumed. In the United States and Canada, radicalization is distinguished from “violent radicalization” and violent extremism. In Europe, there is less delineation or qualification with the use of the term.

This distinction is underscored in the U.S. House of Representatives Act H.R. 1955 cited as the “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007”. In this act “violent radicalization” is defined as “the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change”. The term “radicalization” is demarcated as violent or non-violent.

Human rights communities have used this distinction to condemn those who stress the dangers of radicalization. Imperfect analogies have been used with emphasis in Canada. Canada has a Charter of Rights and Freedoms which protect individual belief systems and religion. Examples of radicalism which resulted in positive changes to society are held up by civil rights groups to support the freedom to hold any belief and to dismiss the dangers of radicalization. “Radicalization”, as a term, is seldom used in everyday North America media. This is in contrast to Europe.

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) identified the homegrown terrorist threat as early as 2002. They suggested that there were indications that Muslims in Europe were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for jihad and that “they might proceed to perpetrating localized terrorist attacks” (AIVD, 2002). Canada more recently publicly identified the threat. The 2007 Annual report of The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) stated that “the threat of terrorism from extremists posed the most immediate danger to Canada and Canadians in 2006-07”. CSIS identified that “radicalization of citizens or residents of other Western countries” was a key focus (CSIS, 2007).

In 2006 Canada was confronted with the situation that the Dutch had earlier observed. Grass roots radicalization was leading to home grown terrorism and that this was a trend which was gaining ground (AIVD, 2007). On June 2, 2006, Canada arrested 17 suspects (an 18<sup>th</sup> was arrested later) in an alleged terrorism plot that included a plan to behead the Prime Minister, attack the offices of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the CN tower in Toronto. Of the original 18 suspects, 5 were youths under 18 years of age at the time of their arrest. The issue of radicalization at an early age became a major concern. The men accused of plotting the attack said that they were fighting to “get rid of oppressors”, and intended something on a greater scale than the London bombings (Leong, 2008, June 5).

If “radicalization” is interpreted as not necessarily leading to violence, then it is legally acceptable in liberal democracies where freedom of speech and belief are within the law. If radical beliefs are outside the realm of criminal arrest or prosecution, then should non-violent radicalization be on the radar of security agencies? Whether or not it ought to be the subject of investigation, radicalization is a high priority for security and intelligence services on both sides of the Atlantic. The AIVD believes that even non-violent radicalization is a danger to the democratic legal order and problematic in the polarization which it promotes in society (AIVD, 2007).

### **3. Searching for the Sources of Radicalization**

The sources of radicalization are being debated today among other controversies relating to the nature of “radicalization”. In some quarters there is concern that there is too great a focus on al-Qaeda inspired radicalization and not on radicalization in the broader context. Does the threat come from al-Qaeda central or does the threat come from unassociated “home-grown” self-starters (Hoffman, 2008)?

Other controversies remain. Is the time period for the radicalization process fast or slow? What are the pathways to radicalization? Is radicalization a cognitive or behavioral process? What is the impact of like-minded persons who hold meetings to discuss radical ideas? Are these groups a firewall to violent radicalization? Do they provide protection from individuals becoming terrorists or are they a conveyor belt to terrorism (M. Hafez, private meeting, May 21, 2008, Kansas City, Missouri)? How does al-Qaeda inspired radicalization relate or differ from other types of radicalization?

In a recently published book *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Marc Sageman claims that “jihadi radicalization” occurs due to loose knit cells of disaffected “bunches of guys” who are friends or classmates. These “guys” undergo the “process of radicalization” together. These homegrown “wannabees” form a scattered global network and are a radicalized “leaderless jihad” (Sageman, 2008).

The British Intelligence Service, MI5, the CIA, and the United States National Security Council disagree with this assessment. These agencies consider al-Qaeda to still be important as a central guiding and inspirational source. The Director General of the British Security Service MI-5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller believes that al-Qaeda is involved in a command and control capability in 30 plots in the UK. Al-Qaeda was identified as providing training and guidance to their so-called “British foot soldiers”. She added that this support was on an extensive and growing scale (BBC News, 2006, November 10).

In the National Intelligence Estimate of July 2007, Mike McConnell reported to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (McConnell, 2008) that al-Qaeda continues to be the most serious threat to The United States. The U.S. intelligence community continues to believe that al-Qaeda central leadership is planning high-

impact plots as well as encouraging others in extremist Sunni communities to engage in violent activities (McConnell, 2008).

Academic debates create neat theoretical boundaries. Real time radicalization is not as precise. Self-recruitment and self-indoctrination are playing a larger role in radicalization with the increasing access and influence of the internet. Question and answer sessions from al-Zawahiri, messages from bin Laden and information useful for attack planning are available on the internet and designed to promote radicalization. Direct contacts and training are also used to promote radicalization (al-Zawahiri, 2008). It is not an either/or scenario. It is both. Semantic arguments do not resolve the issue.

Individuals who are being radicalized have recently been described by an NYPD report as “generally unremarkable people with unremarkable lives and unremarkable jobs” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Unearthing specifically what drives these unremarkable people to become radicalized is still unclear? Detailed analyses of the characteristics, histories, circumstances and projected motivations have provided some insight as to the sources of radicalization. The search for the sources, however, is often too limited in terms of start date. The beginnings of radicalization occur early in life.

#### **4. The Sources of Radicalization: Macro-Sources, Micro- Sources and Incipient Sources (MMIS)**

Three general categories of sources will be described and discussed. These are macro level sources of radicalization, micro level sources of radicalization and incipient sources of radicalization. These source categories combine to form a dynamic interactive tri-element model of radicalization.

##### **4.1 Macro Level Sources of Radicalization**

There are many types of radicalization caused by different ideological goals which provide the motivation for radicalization. Radicalization is caused by nationalistic aspirations (nationalistic radicalization), separatist causes (separatist radicalization), fervent commitment to a moral or ethical cause (single cause radicalization), the desire to bring about political, social, religious change or these goals in some combination (socio-political radicalization, politico-religious radicalization). These constitute ***macro level ideological motivational sources of radicalization***.

##### **4.2 Micro Level Sources of Radicalization**

Force sources of radicalization. drive the process of radicalization. These forces are related to the life experiences of the individual. They occur as a result of the interaction of the individual to environmental situations and events. These sources are considered micro level sources because they occur at the level of the individual and not at the theoretical level. The drivers are psychological factors which include subconscious thoughts, environmental or situational factors, emotional responses to

events and situations, inspirational forces and opportunity factors. These forces create reactions which are “push” forces driving the individual to the radicalization process. This set of “sources” constitutes the ***micro level reactive force sources of radicalization***.

### **4.3 Incipient Radicalization**

There is a third set of sources. These are “antecedent” sources. They are “antecedent” because they exist or happen before something else, namely the radicalization process. They are incipient because they are developing and begin at an embryonic stage. They exist prior to the other sources, but can remain dormant or hidden, hence they are latent. Antecedent incipient latent sources have a developmental nature and include the set of developing “attitudes” in a person’s formative years. Four stages of these incipient sources can be identified and together they comprise antecedent ***incipient sources of radicalization***.

## **5. Examples: Sources of Radicalization**

### **5.1 Macro Ideological Factors**

Motivational sources at the macro level are well known and determined by political, religious or social views. They may also be motivated by a dedication to a particular cause. These sources are large scale causes and the motivations are generally ideologically based. They set the theme for the radicalization process but without the details. Details occur at the micro level and antecedent sources provide the receptivity to the radicalization process.

Examples of macro-level motivation are the desire for political separation from an existing state, the desire for the establishment of a new nation state, a belief in religious supremacy and domination, the pursuit of politico-religious domination, the fight for social causes such as anti-abortion, animal rights and environmental protection and other social, political and religious causes.

### **5.2 Micro Reactive Factors**

The micro source level includes the force factors at the individual level. This includes psychological, environmental, emotional, inspirational/spiritual, and opportunity factors. Most of these sources have been identified in the literature on radicalization. One or two of these factors are cherry-picked as the major catalyst acting upon individuals to drive cases of violent radicalization or terrorism. Even if one or several of these micro-reactive factors play a role in promoting radicalization of an individual, it does not satisfy the source requirement of radicalization. The source of radicalization is result of the combined dynamic of these factors with the micro-level motivational factors and the incipient factors. Most of these factors have been described in earlier reports (Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Precht, 2007; Bakker, 2006).

### **Psychological factors**

Psychological sources include internal influences that propel a person into the radicalization process. Included are the experiences, thoughts and associations and their interaction that lead to radicalization. These thoughts can be influenced by friends and associates, family members, religious and political leaders and the internet.

### **Environmental Factors**

Environmental sources at the individual level include reactions of the individual to the environment. These are the situational and contextual drivers that create social alienation, and isolation. Factors such as unemployment, unfair treatment at work, discrimination and personal or professional disappointments are environmental sources of radicalization. They are contributing factors. These experiences impact on the individual and help drive the radicalization process.

### **Emotive Factors**

Emotive sources are the reactions to stressful situations, crises, government policies and perceived oppression. Prior attitudes contribute to the strength of emotional responses, but do not determine the response. Two individuals may have the same views regarding a government policy such as the armed intervention in Afghanistan. Their reactions (emotive responses) to this same policy can differ. One person may react with hostility, anger and violent action. The other may react with deep sadness and disappointment. Two very different emotional responses where the first scenario may serve as a catalyst to radicalization and the second case would not. The type and strength of emotive response is a force factor.

### **Inspirational Factors**

Inspirational sources can be direct or non-direct. An individual may have direct contact with a person who serves as a spiritual mentor or guide or he may be connected to the inspirational source through books, promotional literature, the internet, videos or other remote means of communication. Preachers of hate, revenge, retribution and violence can be the inspirational push force on the path of radicalization.

### **Opportunity Source**

The opportunity source is required to move the radicalization process to the final violent stage. This source is contact with individuals who possess the knowledge and capacity to conceive and direct attacks, the capacity to acquire the necessary assets for an attack, the organizational capacity for detailed logistical planning and the financial resources to fund the plan.

### **5.3 Incipient Sources**

The set of antecedent attitudes which an individual has been exposed to throughout his formative years cognitively supports the radicalization process. This source

defines the radicalization type and is the determinant of the impact strength that results from environmental stresses. Attitudes modulate or exacerbate emotional responses to negative events that drive the radicalization process.

The tri-element dynamic model of radicalization requires all the components to interact. Noteworthy is the fact that the process begins much earlier than the identified pre-radicalization process. In fact, incipient radicalization begins after birth.

## **6. Stages of Incipient Latent Radicalization (ILR)**

The development of attitudes which are sympathetic to an extremist ideology can promote radicalization through the creation of unconscious and dormant thought patterns and associations. These thought patterns are triggered into conscious expression and action at a later period and can result in vulnerability and action in the direction of radicalization.

Children in Amsterdam as young as 8 years of age have been found to be exhibiting anti-western and anti-democratic values (Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek, 2005). Incipient radicalization starts earlier than 8 years of age. It can be latent and exist in an unexpressed form for years. Incipient radicalization becomes less dormant as the child progresses through the school age years.

Four stages of incipient radicalization are identified and described below. Thought patterns and attitudes which occur at these stages determine vulnerability to radicalization later in life.

### **Stage 1: Language and Thought Onset (0-3 years)**

This stage relates to the beginning acquisition stage of language, thought and values. Language has many functions. Language is considered a tool for organizing thinking (Vygotsky, 1962). Thought development is determined by language. Children think first in complex groupings of objects connected by facts. Parent and caregiver communication conveys attitudes and values. The trust of the child adds credibility to the messages that are communicated in these early years.

At this stage of development, the child is experiencing his first exposure to his environment and objects and persons are labeled good and bad. Life exists in simplistic terms. The child is increasingly aware of what is going on around him and hears and comprehends emotions such as anger and hostility. If parents label people or things as good or bad the message is received by the child.

Children by the end of this stage understand that some people are good and others are bad. During the Nazi occupation of Holland, children were taught who was "good" or "bad dependent on whether the parents were collaborators with the Nazis or not. Values are learned early in life.

A British woman who runs the blog [www.unitedummah.wordpress.com](http://www.unitedummah.wordpress.com) describes how she will pass her views to her two and one-half year old daughter (Gardham, 2008, June 11). She explained in December 2007 that her daughter "knows the difference between a kaffir and a Muslim. Some days she'll stand at the

window telling me she's looking at the kaffir go by. Other days when I speak to her about Sheikh Usaamah, she'll think about it and reply with *go away kaafir* and raise her hand as if to hit someone".

By the time this little girl enters school at 4 she will have acquired significant vocabulary, grammar skills and attitudes. She will have developed associations that will make her vulnerable to radicalization later in life. Language is the primary form of interaction through which adults transmit to the child the body of knowledge that exists in the culture. If that knowledge is hate, hostility and rejection, then this is transmitted.

### **Stage 2: Cognitive Development and School Experience (4-8 years)**

The social cognition learning model asserts that culture is the prime determinant of individual development. Once a child is in the educational system, he is exposed to adult teachers with ideas that may be other than those of his parents or early caregivers. He is exposed to new knowledge and ideas. If these ideas are greatly divergent from those which he has earlier been exposed at home, he may experience some cognitive discomfort.

Every human child develops in the context of culture the family values. This cultural background has a significant effect on than child and even if the home based values are abandoned later in life. Even rejected values are retained in memory. Throughout one's life there may be struggle between attraction and rejection of early cultural ideas.

Parvis Khan, the ringleader of the plot to kidnap and behead a British soldier exposed his extremist views to his three children. He was recorded communicating with his 5 year old son who is in stage 2 of incipient radicalization. Khan had already indoctrinated his son in al-Qaeda "cultural values" by 5 years of age. The child is asked "who do you love?" He responds "I love Sheikh Osama Bin Laden". He is asked "who do you kill?" He responds. "America kill", "I kill Bush", and. "Blair kill". He also wanted to kill the kuffar, Hindus and drunks (Dodd, 2008, February 19). He had seen violent videos of such killings, and had been taught the values and attitudes of his father. By 5 years of age he had thought associations, attitudes, and the vocabulary which was linked to his "home based" culture.

In terms of counter-radicalization strategies, it is evident that the norms and values of the host society need to be communicated to the child as early and in as positive and repetitive manner as possible to ensure reinforcement of the message. Exposure should begin no later than this phase of incipient radicalization.

As culture provides children with the content of their thinking and knowledge, it also provides children with the *tools* of thinking. Culture teaches children both what to think and how to think (Vygotsky, 1962).

### **Stage 3: Cognitive Dissonance and Non Like-minded Peers (ages 9 to 13)**

If the language and thought of the host culture is not established and accepted by stage 3 of the incipient radicalization stage, then cognitive dissonance will grow and become problematic for the child. The discomfort felt by the discrepancy between

what you know or believe and contradictory information which is made available is unsettling.

A nine year old child will try to resolve this discrepancy with rigid and simplistic solutions. When a child is asked to learn something that contradicts what he already thinks, particularly if he is committed to that knowledge, resistance to learning is likely. This can create academic and behavior problems.

A nine year old boy named Rashid was described on a website by his father. He is quoted "I don't care if you kill me cause I'm not afraid of you or to die for Allah, and I'll have a lot of wives in jenna (heaven) insha allah and we will have fun doing what we want there if Allah lets us"(Gardham, 2008, June 11). Rashid is mixing play with killing and dying and having wives. He has already established a "we versus them" thought association. He is talking of death and martyring, and this is the United Kingdom.

By nine years old, Rashid has integrated the thought and language patterns of an extremist religious ideology into his identity. This knowledge is in opposition to the culture of the society in which Rashid lives. The contradictions of cultural norms can result in a distrust and rejection of other information conveyed by the teachers.

The child may also hear a total rejection of the educational system. This will further add to cognitive discomfort and mistrust in the educational system. The U.K. Centre for Social Cohesion has reported this posted message. "How can we say Laa ilaaha illaah (there is no God but Allah) and allow our children to be educated and dictated by the kuffaar in school everyday?" (Gardham, 2008, June 11)

#### **Stage 4: Cognitive Consonance and Group Think (14-18 years)**

The discomfort of cognitive dissonance is caused by the discrepancy between what you know or believe and contradictory information made available by peers, government or the media in the country of residence. This is unsettling to the adolescent already struggling with identity. The need to accommodate to new ideas and cultural and behavior norms which differ from those with which one has been raised threaten identity and self-concept. Dissonance is most powerful when it is about self-image. The adolescent at stage 4 of incipient radicalization seeks to decrease the tension of cognitive dissonance by approach-avoidance action. He approaches those ideas that are consonant and avoids those ideas that are not. This provides high vulnerability to radicalization if the early ideas are consonant with extremism.

Identity issues have been implicated in the radicalization process. By immersing oneself in a knowledge base consistent with early established ideology, these values can be justified and tension reduced. In this way, groups of "like-minded buddies", or small groups sharing common ideology are able to reinforce a known message and release unpleasant tension. Searching for extremist websites provides a similar release from dissonance. The adolescents associated with the Toronto 18 fit into this pattern.

To reduce dissonance, the students were vulnerable to recruitment. They went on paintball and military type camping activities which supported their comfortable

ideology. Other activities and discussions within the group supported their search for cognitive consonance. Dissonance increases with the importance of the subject and with the strength of thought conflict. Disloyalty to religion and values create high tension in identity. Tension is reduced if the adolescent has the ability to rationalize and explain away the conflict. With religious belief and loyalty, rational explanation is difficult.

## **7. Radicalization and Terrorist Groups**

The role of violence in radicalization is important. The Canadian RCMP definition describes radicalization as a process of adopting an extremist belief that *may* include violence at its final stage but *may not* include violence. Radicalization can occur with any extremist group. Groups which support nationalistic movements, environmental issues, religious extremism, political ideology, animal rights, aboriginal rights, political independence are included as examples of radicalization.

Is the process of radicalization similar among all groups? If motivations or ideology differ, do the sources remain the same at the micro and antecedent levels? Are the means used the same in order to achieve the ends. Although radical groups are not equally dangerous, the combined tri-element dynamic model of radicalization will apply to all groups. The macro and micro elements and the incipient sources are present although in some radicalization instances, the incipient factors may be more obvious or more obscure.

In Europe today most concern is focused on the threat of Islamist radicalization and extremism. In Canada, the concern is of a broader range of radicalization. Canada is concerned about al-Qaeda inspired extremists, but also violent action from some First Nations groups, Sikh extremists, Tamil extremists, and single cause extremists.

The Library of Congress (LC) working with the Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Centre prepared a report on nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism (Berry et al., 2003). The report cites Canada as a haven for terrorists and extremists. The easy access to The United States from Canada through the over 5,000 mile long and largely undefended border is listed as a major concern to the U.S.A.

The LC report cites the case of Ahmed Ressam as an example of this problem. Ressam was arrested in December 1999 on his way to the United States from Canada by car with bomb-making material that he planned to use to attack the Los Angeles airport. Canada's immigration and refugee protection policies were named the foremost factor in making Canada "hospitable to terrorists and international criminals" (Berry et al., 2003). Canadian policies were also cited as attracting large numbers of illegal immigrants, including terrorists.

Canada has been accused of being a haven for terrorist organizations by knowledgeable Canadians as well. David Harris, the former chief of strategic planning for CSIS, the Canadian Intelligence Security Service, was quoted as stating

that there are as many as 50 terrorist organizations operating in Canada, and that Canada “a wealthy and modern country has everything for the discriminating terrorist” (CBC News, 2002, April 26).

Pressure from the USA and critics resulted in Canada proscribing terrorist entities and as of June 2008, 40 groups were listed as terrorist entities (Public Safety Canada, 2008, June 15). The listings include Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Jihad, Al-Qaeda (Al Qaida), Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (AAMB), Al Gama’a al Islamiyya (AGAI), Al-Ittihad Al Islam (AIAI), Ansar al-Islam (AI), Armed Islamic Group (Armed Islamic Group, Babbar Khalsa (BK), Babar Khalsa International (BKI), Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) (“Islamic Resistance Movement”), Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM), Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Hizballah, International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Islamic Army of Aden (AIAA), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), Klahanie Chai (KACH), Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Mujahedin e Khalq (MEK), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Sendero Luminoso (SL) and Vanguardians of Conquest (VOC).

This list includes Tamil radicals, Sikh extremists, radical Sunni Muslim groups, radical Shiite Islamist Marxist groups, Islamist extremist groups with origins in Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Kashmir, Central Asia, South East Asia, Somalia and Ethiopia. It includes Marxist groups in Colombia (FARC and AUC) and radical armed Palestinian groups committed to the destruction of the State of Israel. It includes a right wing politico-religious, anti-Arab Jewish terrorist Group, a Japanese religious terrorist group (AUM Shinrikyo), and nationalist separatist groups including Kurdish, Sikh and Basque groups (ETA). Domestic indigenous radicals, such as the Mohawk Warrior Society, a First Nations Group, abortion radicals, and animal rights activists are not designated on the list but have been active in Canada and are still of concern.

Terrorist activities in Canada have been attributed to immigrants who brought their hard line views or nationalistic goals with them from their homelands. There has been active fundraising and remittances back to home countries for terrorist activities. Canada has been a staging ground for terrorist causes, for promotion of terrorist activities and for the recruitment and radicalization of youth. CSIS reports that many of the extremists today as are no longer immigrants but homegrown. The hard line views are being passed from father to son and generation to generation (CSIS, 2004).

The characteristics of the home grown terrorist have emerged from the analyses of known terrorists and those who have become radicalized. What are these characteristics? Home grown terrorists of today are second or third generation in the western country, and are primarily men although women are becoming more prominent in planning attacks. These men are 15 to 35 years of age and live in male-

dominated societies within liberal western democracies. They come mostly from middle class families, are often students with at least a high school education and many have university education. Some are recent converts to a new faith or ideology. They have little or no criminal history and have “ordinary lives. They are from varied ethnic backgrounds.

## **8. Stages of Radicalization**

By 2005, the concept of a timeline for radicalization had been discussed in The Netherlands including stages (Pressman, 2005). In earlier work on measuring social integration and radicalization attitudes, it was evident that attitudes preceded the hardened radicalization process (Pressman, 2006a, 2006b). The report by the NYPD in 2007 divided and labeled four distinct stages of radicalization. These stages were identified as pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization. Each of these stages is considered unique and has specific signatures (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The report contributes to the understanding of the processes of radicalization. The focus of the report is on one type of radicalization and there is a need to universalize the analysis.

## **9. The Need for Incipient Radicalization in the Models**

The four stages of radicalization described by the NYPD are compatible with the tri-element dynamic model of radicalization which combines macro, micro and incipient factors of radicalization. This model attempts a more comprehensive explanation of the process and sources of radicalization.

Regarding the available models to explain radicalization, Precht observed that the sources that have been implicated in the process of radicalization are common to many people (Precht, 2007) As only a few go on to be radicalized, there is not yet a sufficiently strong explanatory model. Many people in society experience discrimination, job losses, racism, personal trauma, death of a loved one, personal disappointment, marital breakdowns, anger and disagreement with government policy decisions, and religious devoutness. Why some people go on to radicalization and others do not go on, needs to be explained?

We do not know how many individuals in groups which are thought to be at risk for radicalization hold attitudes consistent with pre-radicalization. The tri-element combined dynamic model postulates that there are pre-existing tendencies which allow radicalization to develop prior to the pre-radicalization stage. These preconditions, namely *incipient radicalization* needs to be more fully defined and described. It is also important to have greater knowledge of the attitudes held by individuals after the incipient radicalization period.

## **10. Examples of Violent Radicalization**

What are some examples of violent radicalization in Canada and Europe? The following list is not exhaustive but provides illustrations of a range of violent radicalization of concern today but not exclusive to one target group.

The terrorist attacks in Spain, the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands were carried out by individuals who had gone through the process of radicalization. This is the case of arrested suspects in other European countries. As the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism has put it, “terrorists are not born, they are made”. “Not every young person who turns radical becomes a terrorist, but every terrorist started out with radical ideas (NCTb, 2007, November 19).

Radicalization ultimately resulted in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings. The terrorism act consisted of a series of bombings against the commuter train system of Madrid. This attack (three days before Spain’s general election) killed 191 people and wounded 1755. On July 7, 2005 at 8:50 a.m. three bombs in the London underground trains exploded within 50 seconds of each other. A fourth bomb exploded on a bus at 9:47 a.m. in Tavistock Square. The bombings killed 52 commuters, the 4 suicide bombers and injured 700. This was the largest and deadliest terrorist attack on London in its history.

The Transatlantic aircraft plot of August 2006 was an alleged plot to detonate liquid explosives carried on board several airliners traveling from the United Kingdom to Canada and the United States. The plot was discovered and suspects were arrested in and around London on August 9, 2006.

The murder of Theo Van Gogh in the early morning of November 2, 2004 by Mohammed Bouyeri was a severe shock to liberal and tolerant Netherlands. Bouyeri shot Van Gogh 8 times with an HS 200 handgun while Van Gogh was bicycling to work. Bouyeri then cut Van Gogh’s throat, nearly decapitating him and stabbed him in the chest leaving two knives. A five page note attached to one of the knives threatened Western governments, Jews and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The note carried references to the radical Egyptian organization Takfir wal-Hijra. These attacks have all occurred in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

In the late twentieth century radicalization was also present. European terrorists of the 1970’s and 1980’s were motivated by revolutionary political ideology such as Communism or anarchism. These terrorists generally perceived the state as oppressive and acted against the state (Precht, 2007). The terrorist suspects arrested in Toronto Canada almost 40 years later similarly cited oppression as one element of motivation.

In Canada, the 1970’s and 80’s were full of nationalistic fervor. The FLQ crisis occurred in October 1970. On October 5<sup>th</sup>, the Front du Liberation du Quebec (Liberation Cell), a French Canadian nationalist group kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross. He was taken by 4 men who had three machine guns and one with a revolver and he was held by the group until December 3, 1970. The Quebec Minister of Labor, Pierre Laporte, was kidnapped October 10<sup>th</sup> (by the

Chenier Cell) and subsequently murdered. The dead body of Pierre Laporte was discovered in a trunk of a car in Montreal on October 17, 1970. He had been strangled to death. The shock and disbelief that followed this event in Canada was not unlike that of the reaction in the Netherlands to Van Gogh's brutal murder.

The FLQ is a fringe terrorist organization dedicated to bringing about an independent socialist Quebec. Although they came to the attention of the public after the October 1970 crisis, the group had been active for some time. They had engaged in over 200 bombings between 1963 and 1970. Some of the targets included McGill University, The Montreal Stock Exchange and the Home of the Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau.

The FLQ was willing to use robberies to obtain financial support, violence to produce fear in the population, bombings and kidnappings and murder, and finally revolution. They were in fact responsible for 3 killings by bombs and 2 killings by gunfire.

The Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) was influenced by the independence movements in Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba. They believed that Anglophone Quebecers were oppressors of the French Canadians. Their objective was to overthrow the Quebec Government and obtain Quebec independence from Canada. Although the FLQ is now considered inactive, the independence movement in Quebec remains active. By 1970, 23 members of the FLQ were in prison including four members who were convicted of murder.

There are comparisons between the FLQ and current Islamist radicalization. Both perceived "oppression" by the state. There was an intention with both groups to overthrow the current government. There was ideological commitment to a cause. There was the willingness to use violence including murder. There was incipient radicalization. In the case of the FLQ there was the historical grievance of the original loss of French sovereignty that was conveyed to children at an early age and incipient radicalization based on religious ideology in the case of Islamist radicalization. As James Cross, the kidnapped British diplomat commented after his release, these were convinced and fervent revolutionaries. This is not unlike al-Qaeda.

Canada has had other urban guerillas. The Squamish Five who were in fact referred to as "urban guerrillas" were active in Canada during the 1980's. They chose the name "Direct Action" because they believed that they needed to get their message across by taking action. Their method of promoting their propaganda was by deed which they hoped would encourage others to take action. The group consisted of five members (Ann Hansen, Brent Taylor, Juliet Caroline Belmas, Doug Stewart and Gerry Hannah). On October 14<sup>th</sup> 1982, they bombed a Litton Industries factory north of Toronto, Ontario. This plant manufactured guidance devices for American cruise missiles. Ten people were injured.

Members of the Babbar Khalsa and the International Sikh Youth Federation are considered violent and dangerous extremists in Canada. These groups which were centered in both Vancouver and Duncan British Columbia were implicated in the downing of Air India Flight 182 from Vancouver enroute to Sahar India on June

23, 1985. The Boeing 747 was destroyed at 9500 meters in the air with 329 people on board including 280 Canadians. This was the single deadliest attack involving aircraft until September 11, 2001 and it remains Canada's deadliest terrorist incident. The group was agitating for a separate Sikh state (Khalistan) at the time in Punjab, India. The group is banned in Europe, the United States and Canada. There is still concern by security services over Sikh radicalization and extremism in Canada.

A 2005 draft of the Canadian Forces' counter-insurgency manual identified the Mohawk Warrior Society as an example of a domestic group that could use terror tactics to further its cause. They were later removed from the list when the Chiefs denounced the inclusion of the group as an attack on natives' right to protest. This group caused a crisis in 1990 known as The Oka Crisis. It began on July 11, 1990 and lasted until September 26, 1990, a period of 78 days. The conflict and violence was the result of a land claim dispute which included a burial ground and a sacred grove of Pine trees. The dispute was between the town of Oka, Quebec and the Mohawk Community of Kanasatake. The conflict resulted in three deaths and was the first of a number of violent conflicts between indigenous peoples and the Canadian government.

There are increasing incidents of religious extremism which are believed to be inspired by al-Qaeda. Mohammed Jabarah was a St. Catherine's Ontario school boy who grew up to have ties to Osama bin Laden. He was sentenced to life in prison in the U.S. in January 2008. This sentence was for plotting to bomb U.S. embassies in Manila and Singapore. He was indoctrinated by radical Islam and by the age of 19 was a rising star in Al-Qaeda. He was supposedly one of the most trusted operatives from North America. His first handler in 2001 was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Jabarah is Canada's only convicted "homegrown terrorist."

His brother Abdul Rahman Jabarah, a former Carleton University student was killed in a gunfight in 2003 with Saudi Arabian authorities. He was part of a group of suspects wanted in connection with a truck bombing in Riyadh. Both brothers were prized for their Canadian passports.

Kassem Daher, businessman from Alberta is alleged to have been active in a cell that promoted violent jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia and Eritrea. He is accused of running a Canadian end of a terrorist support network from Edmonton using a Muslim charity as a cover. He was arrested in Lebanon in February 2000.

The Khadrs are known as Canada's first family of terrorism, and were referred to in Pakistan and Afghanistan as "al-Kanadi". Ahmed Said Khadr immigrated to Canada from Egypt in the 1970's and lived and studied at university in Ottawa. He began traveling to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s. He was a key associate of bin Laden and raised millions of dollars in Canada to fund terrorist operations. He died in Pakistan in 2003 in a gun battle with the Pakistan army. Abdullah Khadr, his eldest son, is considered dangerous. He has admitted to supplying weapons in Afghanistan. He is also alleged to have run an extremist training camp in Lowgar province Afghanistan. He returned to Toronto in 2005 and is fighting extradition to the US to face charges. Toronto born Omar Khadr is currently in custody at Guantanamo

Bay. He is alleged to have killed a U.S. army medic with a grenade in July 2002 and is scheduled to go to trial before the end of 2008. Abdul Karim Khadr was shot in the spine in the fight that killed his father. He returned to Toronto, Canada in 2004 so that he could receive free Canadian medical treatment (CBC News, 2004, March 3).

At the time of writing there are two trials underway which involve alleged terrorist offences. One case involves Momin Khawaja, who is suspected of involvement in a terror plot. The second trial is for a suspect who was under 18 years of age when arrested in the "Toronto 18" terror plot.

Another group of radicalized individuals who have been active in Canada is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE. This group is fighting for independence for Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamil minority and was placed on Canada's list of designated terrorist groups on April 10, 2006. The LTTE is a guerilla group that promotes suicide bombings. The LTTE in Canada have been primarily involved in terrorist financing.

On October 1995, Manickavasagam Suresh, a coordinator of the World Tamil Movement was arrested for raising money for the Tamil Tigers. Immigration officials have been trying to deport him ever since. He has remained in Canada by launching repeated court appeals. On August 2006, following a joint FBI-RCMP investigation, Project O-Needle, seven Canadians were charged for allegedly trying to buy weapons for the LTTE. On November 15, 2007 the US Treasury froze the assets of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization office in Toronto alleging that it is part of a worldwide network of support to the Tamils. On March 14, 2008 Prapa.Thambithuri was charged under Canada's terrorism financing law, which makes it a crime to collect money with the knowledge that it "will be used by or benefit a terrorist group".

Thambithuri, like many other immigrants to Canada was born abroad and was raised and educated. It is evident that incipient radicalization played a role in his radicalization. These early influences combined with macro-ideological motivation and micro-level radicalization force drivers resulted in his radicalization.

## **11. Is Radicalization Important to the "man on the street"?**

Radicalization is of concern to security and intelligence organizations and has appeared as a priority in their published reports (CSIS, 2007; AIVD, 2007; United States Government 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Is it equally important to the average man or woman on either side of the Atlantic?

In the Netherlands, walk into a "brown café" in a town outside of Amsterdam, or attend a social gathering in North Holland or South Holland. If the issue of "*radicaliseering*" is raised, the response is immediate and definitive. There is social preoccupation with immigration and radicalization in The Netherlands. There is worry over societal polarization. There is concern over security and religion. There is debate over what it means to be "Dutch" (Pressman, 2006a).

In the United Kingdom the press, television and other media are peppered daily with articles discussing the problems of radicalization and integration. Religious institutions participate in the dialogue and there is a preoccupation about what it

means to be “British” and how far should accommodation go? The Danes similarly ask what it means to be Danish. They debate freedom of speech and the press and contemplate the reaction of the cartoon controversy. France has highlighted its tradition as a secular state and enacted legislation restricting the dress code in schools to secular items. The press asks what it means to be French, while worrying about the riots of November 2005.

.In the United States, people on the street are not overly preoccupied with radicalization. Lawrence, Kansas, is a university town of approximately 100,000 in Middle America. Here the reaction to the question “what comes to mind when you hear the word radicalization” is a blank stare. Educated residents on the street have not thought about the term. There is a struggle to define it. Responses relate back to “radical ideas” and anti-Vietnam war protesters of the 1960’s. “Radicalization” is not a term frequently used in the media. “Radicalization is not on personal radar screens (Pressman, 2008).

The majority of Canadians are not preoccupied with radicalization. They think of Canada as a multicultural welcoming country, rich in opportunity and space. Canadians consider that they are fortunate and have been open and generous to immigrants historically. They are proud of their tolerant society. The average worker is more concerned about the economy than with national security. It is not politically correct to talk about radicalization in Canada, and if the adjective “violent” is not specifically used, non-violent radicalization is assumed. A distinction is made between terrorism and radicalization in the Canadian lexicon.

Radical ideas are acceptable” to most Canadians because such ideas are considered within the range of normal dissent. “Radical” does not carry a negative connotation. A “radical” is interpreted by Canadians as someone who “proposes” fundamental political change”, and radicalization is related to this concept in the mind of the average Canadian. Indeed, radicalism can carry a positive connotation. Tommy Douglas, one of the longest serving members of Canada’s Parliament, and considered one of the greatest Canadians, was an early socialist “radical” from Saskatchewan. His radical ideas are credited with the introduction of socialized medicine in Canada, a cherished benefit. Douglas was also a champion of social welfare reforms that were radical ideas when he first introduced them.

## **12. Final Comments**

Radicalization in North America is not considered by the general population to be as crucial an issue as it is in Europe. In Canada and The United States, the average citizen does not focus on radicalization as a danger to their security. There is a divide in transatlantic reality concerning the threat of radicalization. This divide does not prevail in terms of the preoccupation of intelligence and security agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. Here there is common interest and information sharing, and a high level of concern about radicalization in North America and Europe.

Subtle differences exist in the definitions and the denotation of the word “radicalization” on the two sides of the Atlantic. There is greater concern about non-violent radicalization and its effect on the polarization of society in Europe than in North America. There is also more concern about the dangers of failed integration and its relationship to radicalization, alienation of groups and violence.

The “types” of radicalization of interest to security services are broader in North America than in Europe. This is particularly evident in Canada. In Europe the focus seems to be on Islamist radicalization and Canada is reluctant to target or focus on any one group.

There are small but significant differences in interpretation of radicalization on the two sides of the Atlantic which influence policies and responses.

The geographic size of Canada and The United States plays a role in the citizen perception of the threat of radicalization. The countries are large. Concern and perceived threat are influenced by distance. In Canada, a security threat that occurs in Toronto does not translate with the same concern intensity for residents of Vancouver. The same is true south of the border. Geographical divisions become geographical areas of relevance, as countries in Europe respond differently to threats in another country.

Canada and the USA are proud of their respective immigrant histories and are founded on the contributions and success of their immigrants. Historically there has been less suspicion of immigrants, less concern with visible cultural differences and a greater openness to new population groups than in Europe. This has not eliminated the threat of radicalization, but there is a general impression, albeit misplaced, that this will afford protection from dangerous radicalization. Governments continue to believe that multiculturalism in Canada and assimilation in The United States have been working.

New problems are emerging in North America and the sources of violent radicalization need to be understood and countered. A model of radicalization has been proposed that combines elements of incipient attitudes, macro-level ideological motivations and micro-level reactive responses to situations that contribute to radicalization. These elements need to be considered within the context of a dynamic and integrated process that interactively comprises the sources of radicalization. .

We still do not have the whole picture. The important question is what influences will affect these sources so that they can be reversed or prevented. Violent radicalization will not go away. Understanding the interaction and dynamic processes of radicalization including the less understood early incipient sources, will assist in giving direction to the task of developing effective and reliable counter-radicalization strategies.

## Bibliography

- AIVD. (2002). *Rekrutering in Nederland voor de jihad van incident naar trend*.
- AIVD. (2005). *AIVD Annual Report 2004*. Retrieved from [https://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/43523/annualreport2004\\_aivd.pdf](https://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/43523/annualreport2004_aivd.pdf)
- AIVD. (2004). *From Dawa to Jihad*. Retrieved from <https://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/42345/fromdawatojihad.pdf>
- AIVD. (2007). *Radical Dawa in Transition: The Rise of Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands*. Retrieved from <https://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/90126/theradicaldawaintransition.pdf>
- al-Zawahiri, A. (2008). *Selected Questions and Answers from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri – Part 2*. Retrieved from <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefazawahiri0508-2.pdf>
- Bakker, E. quoted in: Expatica. (2005, November 27). Tolerance in the face of terror? *Expatica*. Retrieved from [http://www.expatica.com/nl/life\\_in/feature/tolerance-in-the-face-of-terror-13993.html](http://www.expatica.com/nl/life_in/feature/tolerance-in-the-face-of-terror-13993.html) and elaborated in private conversation.
- Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the Jihad, an exploratory study*. Retrieved January 30, 2007, from [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061200\\_cscp\\_csp\\_bakker.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf).
- BBC News. (2006, November 10). MI5 Tracking "30 UK Terror Plots". *BBC News*. Retrieved from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/6134516.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6134516.stm)
- Bell, S. (2005, November 22). Homegrown Jihadists in Canada pose increasingly serious terrorism threat, are hard to detect, and train inside the country. *The National Post*.
- Berry, L., Curtis, G. E., Gibbs, J. N., Hudson, R. A., Karacan T., Kollars, N., et al. (2003). *Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism*. Retrieved from [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Nats\\_Hospitable.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Nats_Hospitable.pdf)
- CBC News. (2002, April 26). U.S. News Program Alleges Canada Home to Dozens of Terrorist Groups. *CBC News*. Retrieved from [http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/04/26/60mins\\_manley020426.html](http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/04/26/60mins_manley020426.html)
- CBC News. (2004, March 3). The Khadr Family. *CBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/khadr/khadrfamily.html>
- CSIS. (2007). *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Public Report 2006-2007*. Public Works and Government Services Canada.
- CSIS. (n.d.). *Paths to Radicalization of Home-Grown Islamic Extremists in Canada*. Non-published Internal CSIS Report.
- CSIS. (2004). *Sons of the Father: The next generation of Islamic Extremists in Canada IB 2004-5/07*. Originally unreleased internal document, now available at [http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/CSIS\\_SonsOfTheFather.pdf](http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/CSIS_SonsOfTheFather.pdf)
- Cota-McKinley, A., Woody, W., & Bell, P. (2001). Vengeance: effects of gender, age and religious background. *Aggressive Behavior*, 27(5), 343-350.
- Darwish, N. (2006, February 12). We were brought up to hate - and we do. *Telegraph.co.uk*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/02/12/do1205.xml&sSheet=/opinion/2006/02/12/ixop.html>
- Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek. (2005). *Extremisme en radicalisering in het Amsterdamse Voorgezet Onderwijs Project" 5072-C*.
- Dodd, V. (2008, February 19). "America kill. Bush I kill. Blair kill," said five-year-old. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/feb/19/uksecurity.ukcrime1>
- Elshtain, J. B. (2003). *Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power In A Violent World*. New York: Basic Books.
- European Commission. (2005). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization (COM-2005 313 final)*. Retrieved from [http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/COM\\_2005\\_313\\_final.pdf](http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/COM_2005_313_final.pdf)
-

- Expatica. (2005, February 10). Anti-Islamic rhetoric helps radicalisation. *Expatica*. Retrieved from [www.expatica.com](http://www.expatica.com)
- Gardham, D. (2008, June 11). Muslim children in Britain brought up to hate their homeland. *Telegraph.co.uk*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2105429/Muslim-children-in-Britain-brought-up-to-hate-their-homeland.html>
- Glees, A., & Pope, C. (2005). *When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses*. London: The Social Affairs Unit.
- Gray-Block, A. (2005, November 27). Tolerance in the face of terror? *Expatica*. Retrieved from [www.expatica.com](http://www.expatica.com)
- Hoffman, B. (2008). The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3). Retrieved from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501fareviewessay87310/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-terrorism.html>
- Harvey, F. P. (2004). *Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Heuer, R. J. (1999). *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. CIA.
- Horgan, J. (2003). Leaving Terrorism Behind: An Individual Perspective. In A. Silke (Ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences* (pp. 109-130). Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Hudson, R. A. (1999). *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who becomes a Terrorist and Why*. Retrieved from [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc\\_Psych\\_of\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf)
- Husain, E. (2007). *The Islamist. Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left*. London: Penguin Books.
- Leong, M. (2008, June 5). Terror cell wanted to get rid of oppressors. *National Post*.
- MacLeod, I. (2008, February 23). The warning lights are all blinking red. *Ottawa Citizen*. Retrieved from <http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/observer/story.html?id=bb0b1a96-a65b-4373-8e85-dce93f4fbc2d>
- Nesser, P. (2004). *Jihad in Europe - A Survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism in post millennium Europe*. Retrieved from [http://www.cpt-mi.org/pdf/Jihad\\_in\\_Europe\\_39602a.pdf](http://www.cpt-mi.org/pdf/Jihad_in_Europe_39602a.pdf)
- Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. Retrieved from [http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public\\_information/NYPD\\_Report-Radicalization\\_in\\_the\\_West.pdf](http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf)
- Pape, R. A. (2005). *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.
- Perl, R. (2005). *Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness*. Retrieved from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57513.pdf>
- PEW Global Attitudes Project. (2005). Retrieved from [www.pewglobal.org](http://www.pewglobal.org)
- Precht, T. (2007). *Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe: From conversion to terrorism*. Retrieved from [http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning\\_og\\_dokumentation/Home\\_grown\\_terrorism\\_and\\_Islamist\\_radicalisation\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_an\\_assessment\\_of\\_influencing\\_factors\\_2\\_.pdf](http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors_2_.pdf)
- Pressman, D. E. (2005, December 19). *Identifying Changing Indicators During the Radicalization Process: A Time-Line Approach*. Invited Presentation to Regionale Inlichtingen Dienst (Regional Intelligence Service) and District Police Gelderland Zuid District, Nijmegen, Netherlands.
- Pressman, D. E. (2006a). *Countering Radicalization - Communication and Behavioral Perspectives*. Hague: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Pressman, D. E. (2006b). *Measuring and Countering Failed Integration and Radicalization in the Netherlands*. Paper presented at the EU Roundtable on Transatlantic Security "Educating for Migrant Integration - Integrating Migration into Education: European and North American Comparisons". Toronto, Canada.
- Pressman, D. E. (2007, January 10). Closed presentation to Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, CSIS, On early radicalization.
-

- Pressman, D. E. (2007, October 5). *Radicalization Risk, Identity and Social Cohesion*. Closed meetings and presentations to RCMP, National Security Division.
- Pressman, D. E. (2007, November 20). *Countering Radicalization*. Invited presentation to DRDC Adversarial Intent Group, Toronto, Canada.
- Pressman, D. E. (2008). Non-statistical random street polling results, May 24-28.
- Public Safety Canada. (2008, June 15). *Currently Listed Entities*. Retrieved from [www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp](http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp)
- Laqueur, W. (2003). *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Continuum.
- Martin, W., Tops, G. A. J., Schrama, M. H. M., & Bol, J. L. (1998). *Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Nederlands-Engels*. Utrecht: Van Dale.
- McConnel, J. M. (2008). *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*. Retrieved from <http://intelligence.senate.gov/080205/mcconnell.pdf>
- NCTb National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. (2007, November 19). *Netherlands against terrorism campaign aims to beat radicalism at its roots*. Retrieved from [http://english.nctb.nl/publications/press\\_releases/2007/press\\_release\\_20071119.aspx](http://english.nctb.nl/publications/press_releases/2007/press_release_20071119.aspx)
- RCMP Alternative Analysis Unit. (2007). Internal communication.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding Terrorist Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sageman, M. (2008). *Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J. (1998). *Political Terrorism*. Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- Schuster, H. (2005, March 17). The battle for Saudi hearts and minds. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/03/08/schuster.column/>
- SCP/WODC/CBS. (2005). *Jaarreport Integratie 2005*. Den Haag.
- Shannon, C. E. (n.d.). *Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*. The material in this paper appeared in a confidential report *A Mathematical Theory of Cryptography* dated September 1, 1946, which has now been unclassified.
- Shannon, C. E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. *The Bell System Technical Journal*, 27, 379-423, 623-656.
- Shepard, M., & Teotino, I. (2006, June 5). School kids to terror suspects. *Toronto Star*.
- Silke, A. (2003). Becoming a Terrorist. In A. Silke (Ed.), *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its Consequences* (pp. 29-54). Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Silke, A. (2001). The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems With Research on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13(4), 1-14.
- Sin, L. (2008, March 16). RCMP helps organize conference to battle radical extremism. *The Province*. Retrieved from <http://www.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=d6b25e6d-08b7-4297-9529-1354255fad3e>
- Stern, J. (2003). *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: Harper Collins.
- United States Government. (2007). *H.R. 1955 An Act to prevent homegrown terrorism and for other purposes (Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007)*. Retrieved from [http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/h1955\\_rfs.xml](http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/h1955_rfs.xml)
- U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations*. Retrieved from <http://www.psywarrior.com/psyop.html>
- Vermaat, E. (2005). *De Hofstadgroep*. Soesterberg: Aspekt Publishers.
- Vermaat, E. (2005, December 20). Jason Walters - From Muslim Convert to Jihadist. *Militant Islam Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1449>
- Vygotsky, Lev. (1962). *Thought and Language*. USA: MIT Press.
- Weaver, W. (1963). Some Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication. In C. E. Shannon & W. Weaver (Eds.), *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (pp. 1-28). USA: University of Illinois Press.

All URL addresses were verified on 12.9.2008.